Auschwitz es el lugar donde la Filosofía tropieza. En Auschwitz pierde sus cimientos la Modernidad, porque el discurso moderno no puede referir el mundo de Auschwitz. Por eso Auschwitz es un acontecimiento. Mas es preciso decir la verdad de lo ocurrido si no queremos quedar suspendidos indefinidamente en mitad de la nada, expresándonos como fantasmas en un discurso sin fundamento. Tenemos que bajar a los infiernos; no podemos seguir invocando los valores ilustrados dando la espalda al acontecimiento que los pone (...) en evidencia. Debemos conocer los hechos que demuelen nuestra escritura: volver al lugar del crimen, al origen del trauma, volver a Auschwitz. No para condenarlo por enésima vez, sino para comprenderlo. No basta con la condena. (shrink)

One hundred years ago, Abraham Flexner pulled no punches. He tore the fabric of medical education in the existing medical schools and initiated a revolution that lives on to this day. Among the factors driving the 1910 Carnegie Foundation's Flexner Report was the recognition that "the requirements of medical education have enormously increased and the fundamental sciences upon which medicine depends have been greatly extended" (p. viii). This familiar mantra, enhanced by several log orders, resonates strongly in our own (...) times. Certainly another major factor—if not the predominant one—leading to the Flexner Report was the ineffectual medical educational process employed in most of the 155 commercial and private .. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence receives attention in media as well as in academe and business. In media coverage and reporting, AI is predominantly described in contrasted terms, either as the ultimate solution to all human problems or the ultimate threat to all human existence. In academe, the focus of computer scientists is on developing systems that function, whereas philosophy scholars theorize about the implications of this functionality for human life. In the interface between technology and philosophy there is, however, one imperative aspect (...) of AI yet to be articulated: how do intelligent systems make inferences? We use the overarching concept “Artificial Intelligent Behaviour” which would include both cognition/processing and judgment/behaviour. We argue that due to the complexity and opacity of artificial inference, one needs to initiate systematic empirical studies of artificial intelligent behavior similar to what has previously been done to study human cognition, judgment and decision making. This will provide valid knowledge, outside of what current computer science methods can offer, about the judgments and decisions made by intelligent systems. Moreover, outside academe—in the public as well as the private sector—expertise in epistemology, critical thinking and reasoning are crucial to ensure human oversight of the artificial intelligent judgments and decisions that are made, because only competent human insight into AI-inference processes will ensure accountability. Such insights require systematic studies of AI-behaviour founded on the natural sciences and philosophy, as well as the employment of methodologies from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

Increases in popular xenophobia and racism in a society may (partly) have meso-level reasons. The presence of a xenophobic Radical Right Populist (RRP) party may cause increases in racism and xenophobia because (a) it has an influence on other political actors; and (b) because it has an influence on people's frame of thought. I will identify and discuss various mechanisms that will be put against two empirical cases, France and Sweden. Both have witnessed the emergence of RRP parties during the (...) 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However, although they pursued similar xenophobic programmes and used similar anti-immigration frames, only the emergence of the Front National resulted in a dramatic increase in manifest, politicized xenophobia, whereas the emergence of New Democracy had no such effect. Some important factors behind these diverging effects will be elaborated and discussed in this article. (shrink)

This article discusses fundamental problems in "rational choice theory," as outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of why institutions may not be said to act shows his fundamental presupposition that only "monolithic," unitary entities are capable of action. This is, for him, a reason why only individual human beings may be said to act. Furthermore, human beings may be said to act only insofar as they "maximize" (their "utility") on the basis of a unitary, complete, consistent "preference structure." All action (...) that is not maximization in this sense is for Elster not really human action, but rather instances of "pure causality." Elster distinguishes between the "real," intentional person, who "maximizes," and "purely causal forces" within the person. This article tries to show that this radical, sharp dichotomy between "intentionality," in this narrow sense, and "pure causality" is inadequate as a basis for understanding human action. This radical dichotomy is central to important arguments made by Elster more generally. (shrink)

This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU’s role (...) is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyse experiences of moral concerns in intensive care nursing. The theoretical perspective of the study is based on relational ethics, also referred to as ethics of care. The participants were 36 intensive care nurses from 10 general, neonatal and thoracic intensive care units. The structural characteristics of the units were similar: a high working pace, advanced technology, budget restrictions, recent reorganization, and shortage of experienced nurses. The data consisted of the participants’ examples of (...) ethical situations they had experienced in their intensive care unit. A qualitative content analysis identified five themes: believing in a good death; knowing the course of events; feelings of distress; reasoning about physicians’ ‘doings’ and tensions in expressing moral awareness. A main theme was formulated as caring about - caring for: moral obligations and work responsibilities. Moral obligations and work responsibilities are assumed to be complementary dimensions in nursing, yet they were found not to be in balance for intensive care nurses. In conclusion there is a need to support nurses in difficult intensive care situations, for example, by mentoring, as a step towards developing moral action knowledge in the context of intensive care nursing. (shrink)

This introduction describes the background and reasons why the Mercator-Hondius atlas analysed in this issue became part of the library collection of the Donner Institute.

This paper argues against Jon Elster's contention that there is a fundamentalincompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on theother hand, adaptation to conditions of one's existence in the sense that one'sdesires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While thefirst part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster's discussion ofthese ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the conceptof rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is (...) claimed that Elster's conclusionsconcerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conceptionof human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that thesedefects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally. (shrink)

This article argues against Jon Elster’s contention that there is a fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, autonomy and rationality, and, on the other hand, adaptation to the conditions of one’s existence in the sense that one’s desires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. It is claimed that Elster’s conclusions are premised on a defective conception of human faculties and powers, including a defective conception of human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made (...) that these defects are also characteristic of “rational choice theory” more generally. (shrink)

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and (...) non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions of a mirror neuron system is considered. (shrink)

En el mundo actual, en el que se está reduciendo la abundancia y la inalterabilidad de la diversidad cultural, nuestras barreras culturales se pueden salvar —aunque no adulterar— si todo el mundo en todas partes se acoge a los derechos humanos. En el presente artículo intento defender la idea de que, para conseguirlo, tenemos que elaborar una pluralidad de aprobaciones de los derechos humanos universalmente aplicables que sea diversa pero bien cimentada culturalmente; en resumidas cuentas, deberíamos adoptar una justificación plural (...) de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...) overview over various ways to formulate Leibniz’s law in non-classical logics and two new triviality proofs for naïve set theory are also provided. (shrink)

In recent years, semantical partiality has emerged as an important explanatory concept in philosophical logic as well as in the study of natural language semantics. Despite the many applications, however, a number of mathematically intriguing questions associated with this concept have received only very limited attention. ;The present dissertation aims to present a systematic study of certain types of partiality in the area of basic model theory. Two types of issues are given special attention: Introducing partially defined models, there are (...) many ways to generalize the classical truth definition for sentences of a simple first order language relative to standard, complete models. Different interpretations of the formal framework motivate conflicting truth definitions between language and partial models: A partial model can be taken to represent a part of the world, or a partial information set. The truth of a sentence can be supported directly by a part of the world, but can also follow indirectly from an information set. These notions are related, and the relation motivates a comparison between various weaker and stronger alternative truth definitions. Results are obtained about the extent to which these truth definitions differ, and a number of characterization results are deduced. ;Among other conditions that are not expressible in the framework of standard, complete model theory, a condition of monotonicity or persistence of truth relative to partial models is argued to follow under both the given interpretations of the formal framework. The final chapter investigates the relation between such conditions and expressibility properties in general. These discussions culminate with a combined Lindstrom and persistence characterization theorem. (shrink)

This article argues against the idea that European Union (EU) member states (MSs) that have turned autocratic should be ejected from the EU to ensure that the latter does not itself violate the principle of democracy identified with the all subjected principle (ASP). First, the ASP requires that MSs be democratic before a decision to eject them would be acceptable and at that point, there is no reason to eject them. Second, if EU membership is voluntary as the protagonist of (...) the above idea presupposes, any MS can decide to leave at any point in time and other MSs can decide to leave any MS behind and create a new European organization without it. Taken together, this means that the ASP, which pertains to permanent subjection (to EU law), is irrelevant already from the outset and cannot be used as the main premise for the argument for ejection. Finally, the very disagreement about what kind of organization the EU is and should become, implies that the democratic rights of citizens be given priority over the rights of states. This speaks against the legitimacy of ejecting MSs for democracy protection. (shrink)

We argue that people may resist temptations not only with the aim of acquiring more self-control, but also because they want to convince others that they are patient and already possess self-control.

Lautemann et al. (1995) gave a descriptive characterisation of the class of context-free languages, showing that a language is context-free iff it is definable as the set of words satisfying some sentence of a particular logic (fragment) over words. The present notes discuss how to specialise this result to the class of linear languages. Somewhat surprisingly, what would seem the most straightforward specialisation actually fails, due to the fact that linear grammars fail to admit a Greibach normal form. We identify (...) an alternative specialisation, based on an alternative characterisation of context-free languages, also noted by Lautemann et al. (1995). (shrink)